Paper 2019/707 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/707 ↗
Post-Quantum UC-Secure Oblivious Transfer in the Standard Model with Adaptive Corruptions
Abstract
Since the seminal result of Kilian, Oblivious Transfer has proven to be a fundamental primitive in cryptography. In such a scheme, a user is able to gain access to an element owned by a server, without learning more than this single element, and without the server learning which element the user has accessed. This primitive has received a lot of study in the literature, among which very few schemes are based on lattices. The recent NIST call for post-quantum encryption and signature schemes has revived the interest for cryptographic protocols based on post-quantum assumptions and the need for a secure post-quantum oblivious transfer scheme. In this paper, we show how to construct an oblivious transfer scheme based on lattices, from a collision-resistant chameleon hash scheme (CH) and a CCA encryption scheme accepting a smooth projective hash function (SPHF). Note that our scheme does not rely on random oracles and provides UC security against adaptive corruptions assuming reliable erasures.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2019-06-18: last updated
- 2019-06-18: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/707
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/707,
author = {Olivier Blazy and Céline Chevalier and Quoc Huy Vu},
title = {Post-Quantum UC-Secure Oblivious Transfer in the Standard Model with Adaptive Corruptions},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/707},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/707}
}