Paper 2019/730 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/730 ↗
PQDH: A Quantum-Safe Replacement for Diffie-Hellman based on SIDH
Abstract
We present a post-quantum key agreement scheme that does not require distinguishing between the initiator and the responder. This scheme is based on elliptic curve isogenies and can be viewed as a variant of the well-known SIDH protocol. Then, we present an efficient countermeasure against a side-channel attack that applies to both static and ephemeral versions of SIDH and our scheme. Finally, we show how to obtain an isogeny-based password-authenticated key exchange protocol based on our scheme by applying a construction based on SIDH. Security and computational complexities summaries are also presented.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2019-07-18: last updated
- 2019-06-20: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/730
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/730,
author = {Vladimir Soukharev and Basil Hess},
title = {PQDH: A Quantum-Safe Replacement for Diffie-Hellman based on SIDH},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/730},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/730}
}