Practical Attacks on Reduced-Round AES

Navid Ghaedi Bardeh; Sondre Rønjom

Paper 2019/770 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/770 ↗

Practical Attacks on Reduced-Round AES

Navid Ghaedi Bardeh

Sondre Rønjom

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the security of 5-round AES against two different attacks in an adaptive setting. We present a practical key-recovery attack on 5-round AES with a secret s-box that requires $2^{32}$ adaptively chosen ciphertexts, which is as far as we know a new record. In addition, we present a new and practical key-independent distinguisher for 5-round AES which requires $2^{27.2}$ adaptively chosen ciphertexts. While the data complexity of this distinguisher is in the same range as the current best 5-round distinguisher, it exploits new structural properties of 5-round AES.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2019-07-03: last updated; 2019-07-02: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2019/770
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/770,
      author = {Navid Ghaedi Bardeh and Sondre Rønjom},
      title = {Practical Attacks on Reduced-Round AES},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/770},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/770}
}