Paper 2019/828 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/828 ↗
Optimal Collision Side-Channel Attacks
Abstract
Collision side-channel attacks are efficient attacks against cryptographic implementations, however, optimal collision side-channel attacks and how to compute them efficiently is an open question. In this paper, we show that collision side-channel attacks can be derived using the maximum likelihood principle when the distribution of the values of the leakage function is known. This allows us to exhibit the optimal collision side-channel attack and its efficient computation. Finally, we are able to compute an upper bound for the success rate of the optimal post-processing strategy, and we show that our method and the optimal strategy have success rates close to each other. Attackers can benefit from our method as we present an efficient collision side-channel attack. Evaluators can benefit from our method as we present a tight upper bound for the success rate of the optimal strategy.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2026-09-13: last updated
- 2019-07-18: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/828
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/828,
author = {Cezary Glowacz and Vincent Grosso},
title = {Optimal Collision Side-Channel Attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/828},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/828}
}