Paper 2019/911 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/911 ↗

IoT-Friendly AKE: Forward Secrecy and Session Resumption Meet Symmetric-Key Cryptography

Gildas Avoine
Sébastien Canard
Loïc Ferreira
Abstract

With the rise of the Internet of Things and the growing popularity of constrained end-devices, several security protocols are widely deployed or strongly promoted (e.g., Sigfox, LoRaWAN, NB-IoT). Based on symmetric-key functions, these protocols lack in providing security properties usually ensured by asymmetric schemes, in particular forward secrecy. We describe a 3-party authenticated key exchange protocol solely based on symmetric-key functions (regarding the computations done between the end-device and the back-end network) which guarantees forward secrecy. Our protocol enables session resumption (without impairing security). This allows saving communication and computation cost, and is particularly advantageous for low-resource end-devices. Our 3-party protocol can be applied in a real-case IoT deployment (i.e., involving numerous end-devices and servers) such that the latter inherits from the security properties of the protocol. We give a concrete instantiation of our key exchange protocol, and formally prove its security.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2019-08-12: last updated
2019-08-12: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/911
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/911,
      author = {Gildas Avoine and Sébastien Canard and Loïc Ferreira},
      title = {IoT-Friendly AKE: Forward Secrecy and Session Resumption Meet Symmetric-Key Cryptography},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/911},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/911}
}
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