Paper 2020/028 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/028 ↗
Verified Security of BLT Signature Scheme
Abstract
The majority of real-world applications of digital signatures use timestamping to ensure non-repudiation in face of possible key revocations. This observation led Buldas, Laanoja, and Truu to a server-assisted digital signature scheme built around cryptographic timestamping. In this paper, we report on the machine-checked proofs of existential unforgeability under the chosen-message attack (EUF-CMA) of some variations of BLT digital signature scheme. The proofs are developed and verified using the EasyCrypt framework, which provides interactive theorem proving supported by the state-of-the-art SMT solvers.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2020-01-30: last updated
- 2020-01-13: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/028
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/028,
author = {Denis Firsov and Ahto Buldas and Ahto Truu and Risto Laanoja},
title = {Verified Security of BLT Signature Scheme},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/028},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/028}
}