Paper 2020/1023 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/1023 ↗
Post-Quantum Anonymous Veto Networks
Abstract
Anonymous veto networks (AV-nets), originally proposed by Hao and Zielinski (2006), are particularly lightweight protocols for evaluating a veto function in a peer-to-peer network such that anonymity of all protocol participants is preserved. Prior to this work, anonymity in all AV-nets from the literature relied on the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption and can thus be broken by (scalable) quantum computers. In order to defend against this threat, we propose two practical and completely lattice-based AV-nets. The first one is secure against passive and the second one is secure against active adversaries. We prove that anonymity of our AV-nets reduces to the ring learning with errors (RLWE) assumption. As such, our AV-nets are the first ones with post-quantum anonymity. We also provide performance benchmarks to demonstrate their practicality.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2020-08-27: last updated
- 2020-08-27: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1023
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1023,
author = {Jintai Ding and Doug Emery and Johannes Mueller and Peter Y. A. Ryan and Vonn Kee Wong},
title = {Post-Quantum Anonymous Veto Networks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1023},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1023}
}