Paper 2020/106 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/106 ↗
Relaxed freshness in component authentication
Abstract
We suggests a relaxed freshness paradigm for challenge-response authentication for each field of application where challenger and responder are tightly coupled and authentication takes place in a friendly environment. Replay attacks are not feasible under this premise, and freshness can be relaxed to relative freshness: no refresh is required as long as all previously tested responders were authentic. One field of application is anti-counterfeiting of electronic device components. The main contribution is a formal security proof of an authentication scheme with choked refresh. A practical implication is the lifetime increase of stored challenge-response-pairs. This is a considerable advantage for solutions based on hardware intrinsic security. For solutions based on symmetric keys, it opens the possibility to use challenge-response-pairs instead of secret keys by the challenger – a cheap way to reduce the risk of key disclosure.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2020-02-04: last updated
- 2020-02-04: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/106
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/106,
author = {Frank Schuhmacher},
title = {Relaxed freshness in component authentication},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/106},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/106}
}