Practical Forgeries for ORANGE

Christoph Dobraunig; Florian Mendel; Bart Mennink

Paper 2020/108 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/108 ↗

Practical Forgeries for ORANGE

Christoph Dobraunig

Florian Mendel

Bart Mennink

Abstract

We analyze the authenticated encryption algorithm of ORANGE, a submission to the NIST lightweight cryptography standardization process. We show that it is practically possible to craft forgeries out of two observed transmitted messages that encrypt the same plaintext. The authors of ORANGE have confirmed the attack, and they discuss a fix for this attack in their second-round submission of ORANGE to the NIST lightweight cryptography competition.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2020-02-04: last updated; 2020-02-04: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2020/108
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/108,
      author = {Christoph Dobraunig and Florian Mendel and Bart Mennink},
      title = {Practical Forgeries for ORANGE},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/108},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/108}
}