Paper 2020/1193 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/1193 ↗
Bypassing Isolated Execution on RISC-V with Fault Injection
Abstract
RISC-V is equipped with physical memory protection (PMP) to prevent malicious software from accessing protected memory regions. One of the main objectives of PMP is to provide a trusted execution environment (TEE) that isolates secure and insecure applications. In this study, we propose a fault injection attack to bypass the isolation based on PMP. The proposed attack scheme involves extracting successful glitch parameters for fault injection under the assumption of a black-box environment. We implement a proof-of-concept TEE compatible with PMP in RISC-V, and we verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed attack through some experiments conducted in the TEE. The results show that an attacker can bypass the isolation of the TEE and read data from the protected memory region.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2020-09-30: last updated
- 2020-09-30: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1193
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1193,
author = {Shoei Nashimoto and Daisuke Suzuki and Rei Ueno and Naofumi Homma},
title = {Bypassing Isolated Execution on RISC-V with Fault Injection},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1193},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1193}
}