Paper 2020/1244 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/1244 ↗
Taming the many EdDSAs
Abstract
This paper analyses security of concrete instantiations of EdDSA by identifying exploitable inconsistencies between standardization recommendations and Ed25519 implementations. We mainly focus on current ambiguity regarding signature verification equations, binding and malleability guarantees, and incompatibilities between randomized batch and single verification. We give a formulation of Ed25519 signature scheme that achieves the highest level of security, explaining how each step of the algorithm links with the formal security properties. We develop optimizations to allow for more efficient secure implementations. Finally, we designed a set of edge-case test-vectors and run them by some of the most popular Ed25519 libraries. The results allowed to understand the security level of those implementations and showed that most libraries do not comply with the latest standardization recommendations. The methodology allows to test compatibility of different Ed25519 implementations which is of practical importance for consensus-driven applications.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2021-12-02: last updated
- 2020-10-09: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1244
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1244,
author = {Konstantinos Chalkias and François Garillot and Valeria Nikolaenko},
title = {Taming the many EdDSAs},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1244},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1244}
}