Paper 2020/1347 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/1347 ↗

A Systematic Appraisal of Side Channel Evaluation Strategies

Melissa Azouaoui
Davide Bellizia
Ileana Buhan
Nicolas Debande
Sebastien Duval
Christophe Giraud
Eliane Jaulmes
Francois Koeune
Elisabeth Oswald
Francois-Xavier Standaert
Carolyn Whitnall
Abstract

In this paper we examine the central question that is how well do side channel evaluation regimes capture the true security level of a product. Concretely, answering this question requires considering the optimality of the attack/evaluation strategy selected by the evaluator, and the various steps to instantiate it. We draw on a number of published works and discuss whether state-of-the-art solutions for the different steps of a side-channel security evaluation offer bounds or guarantees of optimality, or if they are inherently heuristic. We use this discussion to provide an informal rating of the steps' optimality and to put forward where risks of overstated security levels remain.

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PDF
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Publication info
Preprint.
History
2020-10-29: last updated
2020-10-29: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/1347
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1347,
      author = {Melissa Azouaoui and Davide Bellizia and Ileana Buhan and Nicolas Debande and Sebastien Duval and Christophe Giraud and Eliane Jaulmes and Francois Koeune and Elisabeth Oswald and Francois-Xavier Standaert and Carolyn Whitnall},
      title = {A Systematic Appraisal of Side Channel Evaluation Strategies},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1347},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1347}
}
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