Paper 2020/1455 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/1455 ↗
An Analytic Attack Against ARX Addition Exploiting Standard Side-Channel Leakage
Abstract
In the last few years a new design paradigm, the so-called ARX (modular addition, rotation, exclusive-or) ciphers, have gained popularity in part because of their non-linear operation's seemingly `inherent resilience' against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) Attacks: the non-linear modular addition is not only known to be a poor target for DPA attacks, but also the computational complexity of DPA-style attacks grows exponentially with the operand size and thus DPA-style attacks quickly become practically infeasible. We however propose a novel DPA-style attack strategy that scales linearly with respect to the operand size in the chosen-message attack setting.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2020-11-19: last updated
- 2020-11-19: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1455
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1455,
author = {Yan Yan and Elisabeth Oswald and Srinivas Vivek},
title = {An Analytic Attack Against ARX Addition Exploiting Standard Side-Channel Leakage},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1455},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1455}
}