Paper 2020/1461 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/1461 ↗
Lower bounds for the depth of modular squaring
Abstract
The modular squaring operation has attracted significant attention due to its potential in constructing cryptographic time-lock puzzles and verifiable delay functions. In such applications, it is important to understand precisely how quickly a modular squaring operation can be computed, even in parallel on dedicated hardware. We use tools from circuit complexity and number theory to prove concrete numerical lower bounds for squaring on a parallel machine, yielding nontrivial results for practical input bitlengths. For example, for $n=2048$, we prove that every logic circuit (over AND, OR, NAND, NOR gates of fan-in two) computing modular squaring on all $n$-bit inputs (and any modulus that is at least $2^{n-1}$) requires depth (critical path length) at least $12$. By a careful analysis of certain exponential Gauss sums related to the low-order bit of modular squaring, we also extend our results to the average case. For example, our results imply that every logic circuit (over any fan-in two basis) computing modular squaring on at least $76\%$ of all $2048$-bit inputs (for any RSA modulus that is at least $2^{n-1}$) requires depth at least $9$.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2020-11-19: last updated
- 2020-11-19: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1461
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1461,
author = {Benjamin Wesolowski and Ryan Williams},
title = {Lower bounds for the depth of modular squaring},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1461},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1461}
}