Paper 2020/147 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/147 ↗

Non-Malleability against Polynomial Tampering

Marshall Ball
Eshan Chattopadhyay
Jyun-Jie Liao
Tal Malkin
Li-Yang Tan
Abstract

We present the first explicit construction of a non-malleable code that can handle tampering functions that are bounded-degree polynomials. Prior to our work, this was only known for degree-1 polynomials (affine tampering functions), due to Chattopadhyay and Li (STOC 2017). As a direct corollary, we obtain an explicit non-malleable code that is secure against tampering by bounded-size arithmetic circuits. We show applications of our non-malleable code in constructing non-malleable secret sharing schemes that are robust against bounded-degree polynomial tampering. In fact our result is stronger: we can handle adversaries that can adaptively choose the polynomial tampering function based on initial leakage of a bounded number of shares. Our results are derived from explicit constructions of seedless non-malleable extractors that can handle bounded-degree polynomial tampering functions. Prior to our work, no such result was known even for degree-2 (quadratic) polynomials.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2020-06-28: last updated
2020-02-10: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/147
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/147,
      author = {Marshall Ball and Eshan Chattopadhyay and Jyun-Jie Liao and Tal Malkin and Li-Yang Tan},
      title = {Non-Malleability against Polynomial Tampering},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/147},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/147}
}
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