Paper 2020/1477 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/1477 ↗
Machine-checking the universal verifiability of ElectionGuard
Abstract
ElectionGuard is an open source set of software components and specifications from Microsoft designed to allow the modification of a number of different e-voting protocols and products to produce public evidence (transcripts) which anyone can verify. The software uses ElGamal, homomorphic tallying and sigma protocols to enable public scrutiny without adversely affecting privacy. Some components have been formally verified (machine-checked) to be free of certain software bugs but there was no formal verification of their cryptographic security. Here, we present a machine-checked proof of the verifiability guarantees of the transcripts produced and verified according to the ElectionGuard specification. We have also extracted an executable version of the verifier specification, which we proved to be secure, and used it to verify election transcripts produced by ElectionGuard. Our results show that our implementation is of similar efficiency to existing implementations.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2020-11-24: last updated
- 2020-11-24: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1477
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1477,
author = {Thomas Haines and Rajeev Gore and Jack Stodart},
title = {Machine-checking the universal verifiability of ElectionGuard},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1477},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1477}
}