Paper 2020/1495 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/1495 ↗

CloudMoles: Surveillance of Power-Wasting Activities by Infiltrating Undercover Sensors

Seyedeh Sharareh Mirzargar
Andrea Guerrieri
Mirjana Stojilović
Abstract

An important security risk in cloud Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) is power wasting, occurring when a design exercises excessive switching activity with the intention to cause voltage-drop related faults in the host FPGA or, in the extreme case, FPGA reset and denial-of-service. In this paper, we introduce the idea of infiltrating undercover sensors for monitoring the fluctuations of FPGA core voltage. Our approach ensures that the shell has full control over sensor placement, done so that FPGA users do not have to sacrifice an inch of their design space nor to be aware that the voltage-fluctuations caused by their design are being monitored. Additionally, we describe how to design voltage-drop sensors that have higher coverage than the state-of-the-art alternatives and experimentally demonstrate that our sensors are indeed able to accurately monitor voltage fluctuations across the entire FPGA. Finally, we propose a novel metric which, after applied on sensor measurements, reveals the location of the source of the highest activity on the FPGA.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
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Implementation
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2020-12-02: last updated
2020-11-29: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/1495
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1495,
      author = {Seyedeh Sharareh Mirzargar and Andrea Guerrieri and Mirjana Stojilović},
      title = {CloudMoles: Surveillance of Power-Wasting Activities by Infiltrating Undercover Sensors},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1495},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1495}
}
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