Paper 2020/1506 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/1506 ↗
Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example
Abstract
Side-channel attacks targeting cryptography may leak only partial or indirect information about the secret keys. There are a variety of techniques in the literature for recovering secret keys from partial information. In this tutorial, we survey several of the main families of partial key recovery algorithms for RSA, (EC)DSA, and (elliptic curve) Diffie-Hellman, the public-key cryptosystems in common use today. We categorize the known techniques by the structure of the information that is learned by the attacker, and give simplified examples for each technique to illustrate the underlying ideas.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2020-12-11: last updated
- 2020-12-02: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1506
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1506,
author = {Gabrielle De Micheli and Nadia Heninger},
title = {Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1506},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1506}
}