Paper 2020/1581 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/1581 ↗

Remark on the Security of CKKS Scheme in Practice

Jung Hee Cheon
Seungwan Hong
Duhyeong Kim
Abstract

Recently, Li and Micciancio (ePrint 2020/1533) have proposed a passive attack on the CKKS approximate homomorphic encryption (HE) scheme, which allows an adversary to query decryption on valid ciphertexts. In this paper, we discuss for which applications such attack is applicable, and introduce an extension of the HEaaN library. In addition, we investigate the mitigation strategies of other HE libraries that support the CKKS scheme including HElib, PALISADE, Lattigo and SEAL.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2020-12-21: last updated
2020-12-21: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/1581
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1581,
      author = {Jung Hee Cheon and Seungwan Hong and Duhyeong Kim},
      title = {Remark on the Security of CKKS Scheme in Practice},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1581},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1581}
}
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