Paper 2020/1581 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/1581 ↗
Remark on the Security of CKKS Scheme in Practice
Abstract
Recently, Li and Micciancio (ePrint 2020/1533) have proposed a passive attack on the CKKS approximate homomorphic encryption (HE) scheme, which allows an adversary to query decryption on valid ciphertexts. In this paper, we discuss for which applications such attack is applicable, and introduce an extension of the HEaaN library. In addition, we investigate the mitigation strategies of other HE libraries that support the CKKS scheme including HElib, PALISADE, Lattigo and SEAL.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2020-12-21: last updated
- 2020-12-21: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1581
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1581,
author = {Jung Hee Cheon and Seungwan Hong and Duhyeong Kim},
title = {Remark on the Security of CKKS Scheme in Practice},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1581},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1581}
}