Paper 2020/324 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/324 ↗
Defeating CAS-Unlock
Abstract
Recently, a logic locking approach termed `CAS-Lock' was proposed to simultaneously counter Boolean satisfiability (SAT) and bypass attacks. The technique modifies the AND/OR tree structure in Anti-SAT to achieve non-trivial output corruptibility while maintaining resistance to both SAT and bypass attacks. An attack against CAS-Lock (dubbed `CAS-Unlock') was also recently proposed on a naive implementation of CAS-Lock. It relies on setting key values to all 1's or 0's to break CAS-Lock. In this short paper, we evaluate this attack's ineffectiveness and describe a misinterpretation of CAS-Lock's implementation.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2020-03-17: last updated
- 2020-03-17: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/324
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/324,
author = {Bicky Shakya and Xiaolin Xu and Mark Tehranipoor and Domenic Forte},
title = {Defeating CAS-Unlock},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/324},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/324}
}