Paper 2020/379 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/379 ↗

Post-quantum WireGuard

Andreas Hülsing
Kai-Chun Ning
Peter Schwabe
Fiona Johanna Weber
Philip R. Zimmermann
Abstract

In this paper we present PQ-WireGuard, a post-quantum variant of the handshake in the WireGuard VPN protocol (NDSS 2017). Unlike most previous work on post-quantum security for real-world protocols, this variant does not only consider post-quantum confidentiality (or forward secrecy) but also post-quantum authentication. To achieve this, we replace the Diffie-Hellman-based handshake by a more generic approach only using key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). We establish security of PQ-WireGuard, adapting the security proofs for WireGuard in the symbolic model and in the standard model to our construction. We then instantiate this generic construction with concrete post-quantum secure KEMs, which we carefully select to achieve high security and speed. We demonstrate competitiveness of PQ-WireGuard presenting extensive benchmarking results comparing to widely deployed VPN solutions.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2023-09-25: last updated
2020-04-03: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/379
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/379,
      author = {Andreas Hülsing and Kai-Chun Ning and Peter Schwabe and Fiona Johanna Weber and Philip R.  Zimmermann},
      title = {Post-quantum WireGuard},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/379},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/379}
}
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