Paper 2020/573 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/573 ↗
Quantifying the Security Cost of Migrating Protocols to Practice
Abstract
We give a framework for relating the concrete security of a “reference” protocol (say, one appearing in an academic paper) to that of some derived, “real” protocol (say, appearing in a cryptographic standard). It is based on the indifferentiability framework of Maurer, Renner, and Holenstein (MRH), whose application has been exclusively focused upon non-interactive cryptographic primitives, e.g., hash functions and Feistel networks. Our extension of MRH is supported by a clearly defined execution model and two composition lemmata, all formalized in a modern pseudocode language. Together, these allow for precise statements about game-based security properties of cryptographic objects (interactive or not) at various levels of abstraction. As a real-world application, we design and prove tight security bounds for a potential TLS 1.3 extension that integrates the SPAKE2 password-authenticated key-exchange into the handshake.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2020-06-05: last updated
- 2020-05-16: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/573
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/573,
author = {Christopher Patton and Thomas Shrimpton},
title = {Quantifying the Security Cost of Migrating Protocols to Practice},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/573},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/573}
}