Security Analysis of NIST CTR-DRBG

Viet Tung Hoang; Yaobin Shen

Paper 2020/619 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/619 ↗

Security Analysis of NIST CTR-DRBG

Viet Tung Hoang

Yaobin Shen

Abstract

We study the security of CTR-DRBG, one of NIST's recommended Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG) designs. Recently, Woodage and Shumow (Eurocrypt' 19), and then Cohney et al. (S&P' 20) point out some potential vulnerabilities in both NIST specification and common implementations of CTR-DRBG. While these researchers do suggest counter-measures, the security of the patched CTR-DRBG is still questionable. Our work fills this gap, proving that CTR-DRBG satisfies the robustness notion of Dodis et al. (CCS'13), the standard security goal for PRNGs.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2020-08-22: last updated; 2020-05-26: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2020/619
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/619,
      author = {Viet Tung Hoang and Yaobin Shen},
      title = {Security Analysis of NIST CTR-DRBG},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/619},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/619}
}