Paper 2020/681 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/681 ↗

An F-algebra for analysing information leaks in the presence of glitches

Vittorio Zaccaria
Abstract

This report deals with the problem of identifying the potential correlations between the observable power consumption of a digital circuit and its inputs, when the operating conditions of the circuit involve a logic hazard (also known as glitch). This problem is of utmost importance when the circuit is a cryptographic primitive that must ensure that secret input data (e.g., keys) does not leak. We present a universal algebra construction that allows to derive a set of artefacts from a digital circuit among which a conservative estimate of the Boolean expression that the circuit might leak as well as the extended input/output correlation matrix [1]. This allows the evaluation of the robustness against side channel attacks through a set of constructions that fall under the umbrella of robust probing security [2]. We believe that such a formalisation is well suited for CAD synthesis tools to help the design of more robust cryptographic primitives.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2020-06-09: last updated
2020-06-09: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/681
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/681,
      author = {Vittorio Zaccaria},
      title = {An F-algebra for analysing information leaks in the presence of glitches},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/681},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/681}
}
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