Paper 2020/770 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/770 ↗

Time-Space Tradeoffs and Short Collisions in Merkle-Damgård Hash Functions

Akshima
David Cash
Andrew Drucker
Hoeteck Wee
Abstract

We study collision-finding against Merkle-Damgård hashing in the random-oracle model by adversaries with an arbitrary $S$-bit auxiliary advice input about the random oracle and $T$ queries. Recent work showed that such adversaries can find collisions (with respect to a random IV) with advantage $\Omega(ST^2/2^n)$, where $n$ is the output length, beating the birthday bound by a factor of $S$. These attacks were shown to be optimal. We observe that the collisions produced are very long, on the order $T$ blocks, which would limit their practical relevance. We prove several results related to improving these attacks to find short collisions. We first exhibit a simple attack for finding $B$-block-long collisions achieving advantage $\tilde{\Omega}(STB/2^n)$. We then study if this attack is optimal. We show that the prior technique based on the bit-fixing model (used for the $ST^2/2^n$ bound) provably cannot reach this bound, and towards a general result we prove there are qualitative jumps in the optimal attacks for finding length $1$, length $2$, and unbounded-length collisions. Namely, the optimal attacks achieve (up to logarithmic factors) order of $(S+T)/2^n$, $ST/2^n$ and $ST^2/2^n$ advantage. We also give an upper bound on the advantage of a restricted class of short-collision finding attacks via a new analysis on the growth of trees in random functional graphs that may be of independent interest.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2020-06-24: last updated
2020-06-24: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/770
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/770,
      author = {Akshima and David Cash and Andrew Drucker and Hoeteck Wee},
      title = {Time-Space Tradeoffs and Short Collisions in Merkle-Damgård Hash Functions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/770},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/770}
}
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