Paper 2020/839 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/839 ↗
Cryptanalysis of a ``Strengthened'' Key Exchange Protocol for IoT, or When SAKE$^+$ Turns Out to Be SAKE$^-$
Abstract
In this paper we make an extensive analysis of SAKE$^+$ and SAKE$^+$-AM, two key exchange protocols. We show that several attacks are practicable against these protocols. This invalidates several claims made by the authors regarding the (security) properties of their protocols. Our results question also the correctness of the corresponding security proofs, made in the computational model (using the game-based methodology), and with the ProVerif verification tool.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2020-08-04: last updated
- 2020-07-12: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/839
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/839,
author = {Loïc Ferreira},
title = {Cryptanalysis of a ``Strengthened'' Key Exchange Protocol for IoT, or When SAKE$^+$ Turns Out to Be SAKE$^-$},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/839},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/839}
}