Paper 2020/856 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/856 ↗

Improving Revocation for Group Signature with Redactable Signature

Olivier Sanders
Abstract

Group signature is a major cryptographic tool allowing anonymous access to a service. However, in practice, access to a service is usually granted for some periods of time, which implies that the signing rights must be deactivated the rest of the time. This requirement thus calls for complex forms of revocation, reminiscent of the concept of time-bound keys. However, schemes satisfying this concept are rare and only allow revocation with limited granularity. That is, signing keys are associated with an expiry time and become definitively useless once the latter has passed. In this paper, we revisit the notion of group signatures with time-bound keys with several contributions. Firstly, we extend this notion to allow high granularity revocation: a member's signing key can in particular be deactivated at some moments and then be automatically reinstated. Secondly, we show that this complex property is actually simple to achieve using redactable signature. In particular, we consider in this context a recent redactable signature scheme from PKC 20 that we improve by dramatically reducing the size of the public key. The resulting construction is of independent interest.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2021-02-23: last updated
2020-07-12: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/856
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/856,
      author = {Olivier Sanders},
      title = {Improving Revocation for Group Signature with Redactable Signature},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/856},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/856}
}
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