Paper 2020/992 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2020/992 ↗
Single-Trace Attacks on the Message Encoding of Lattice-Based KEMs
Abstract
We propose single-trace side-channel attacks against lattice-based KEMs, the current candidates of the NIST's standardization project. More specifically, we analyze the message encoding in the encapsulation of lattice-based KEMs to obtain the ephemeral session keys, concluding that a single trace leakage allows a whole key recovery: our implementation on a ChipWhisperer UFO STM32F3 target board shows 100% success rates for Crystals-Kyber and Saber regardless of optimization level, and more than a 79% success rate for FrodoKEM. We further show that our attack methodologies are not restricted to the above algorithms but widely applicable to other NIST PQC candidates, including LAC, NewHope, NTRU Prime, and NTRU.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2020-12-18: last updated
- 2020-08-18: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/992
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/992,
author = {Bo-Yeon Sim and Jihoon Kwon and Joohee Lee and Il-Ju Kim and Taeho Lee and Jaeseung Han and Hyojin Yoon and Jihoon Cho and Dong-Guk Han},
title = {Single-Trace Attacks on the Message Encoding of Lattice-Based KEMs},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/992},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/992}
}