Paper 2021/1119 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2021/1119 ↗
Automatic Classical and Quantum Rebound Attacks on AES-like Hashing by Exploiting Related-key Differentials
Abstract
Collision attacks on AES-like hashing (hash functions constructed by plugging AES-like ciphers or permutations into the famous PGV modes or their variants) can be reduced to the problem of finding a pair of inputs respecting a differential of the underlying AES-like primitive whose input and output differences are the same. The rebound attack due to Mendel et al. is a powerful tool for achieving this goal, whose quantum version was first considered by Hosoyamada and Sasaki at EUROCRYPT 2020. In this work, we automate the process of searching for the configurations of rebound attacks by taking related-key differentials of the underlying block cipher into account with the MILP-based approach. In the quantum setting, our model guide the search towards characteristics that minimize the resources (e.g., QRAM) and complexities of the resulting rebound attacks. We apply our method to Saturnin-hash, SKINNY, and Whirlpool and improved results are obtained.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2021-09-03: last updated
- 2021-09-03: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/1119
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1119,
author = {Xiaoyang Dong and Zhiyu Zhang and Siwei Sun and Congming Wei and Xiaoyun Wang and Lei Hu},
title = {Automatic Classical and Quantum Rebound Attacks on AES-like Hashing by Exploiting Related-key Differentials},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/1119},
year = {2021},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1119}
}