Paper 2021/1132 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2021/1132 ↗
Safe-Error Attacks on SIKE and CSIDH
Abstract
The isogeny-based post-quantum schemes SIKE (NIST PQC round 3 alternate candidate) and CSIDH (Asiacrypt 2018) have received only little attention with respect to their fault attack resilience so far. We aim to fill this gap and provide a better understanding of their vulnerability by analyzing their resistance towards safe-error attacks. We present four safe-error attacks, two against SIKE and two against a constant-time implementation of CSIDH that uses dummy isogenies. The attacks use targeted bitflips during the respective isogeny-graph traversals. All four attacks lead to full key recovery. By using voltage and clock glitching, we physically carried out two of the attacks - one against each scheme -, thus demonstrate that full key recovery is also possible in practice.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2021-11-22: last updated
- 2021-09-07: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/1132
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1132,
author = {Fabio Campos and Juliane Krämer and Marcel Müller},
title = {Safe-Error Attacks on SIKE and CSIDH},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/1132},
year = {2021},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1132}
}