Paper 2021/1197 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2021/1197 ↗

($\epsilon,\delta$)-indistinguishable Mixing for Cryptocurrencies

Mingyu Liang
Ioanna Karantaidou
Foteini Baldimtsi
Dov Gordon
Mayank Varia
Abstract

We propose a new theoretical approach for building anonymous mixing mechanisms for cryptocurrencies. Rather than requiring a fully uniform permutation during mixing, we relax the requirement, insisting only that neighboring permutations are similarly likely. This is defined formally by borrowing from the definition of differential privacy. This relaxed privacy definition allows us to greatly reduce the amount of interaction and computation in the mixing protocol. Our construction achieves $O(n \cdot polylog(n))$ computation time for mixing $n$ addresses, whereas all other mixing schemes require $O(n^2)$ total computation across all parties. Additionally, we support a smooth tolerance of fail-stop adversaries and do not require any trusted setup. We analyze the security of our generic protocol under the UC framework, and under a stand-alone, game-based definition. We finally describe an instantiation using ring signatures and confidential transactions.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2021-09-17: last updated
2021-09-17: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/1197
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1197,
      author = {Mingyu Liang and Ioanna Karantaidou and Foteini Baldimtsi and Dov Gordon and Mayank Varia},
      title = {($\epsilon,\delta$)-indistinguishable Mixing for Cryptocurrencies},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/1197},
      year = {2021},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1197}
}
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