Paper 2021/1230 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2021/1230 ↗
Two-Round Maliciously Secure Computation with Super-Polynomial Simulation
Abstract
We propose the first maliciously secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocol for general functionalities in two rounds, without any trusted setup. Since polynomial-time simulation is impossible in two rounds, we achieve the relaxed notion of superpolynomial-time simulation security [Pass, EUROCRYPT 2003]. Prior to our work, no such maliciously secure protocols were known even in the two-party setting for functionalities where both parties receive outputs. Our protocol is based on the sub-exponential security of standard assumptions plus a special type of non-interactive non-malleable commitment. At the heart of our approach is a two-round multi-party conditional disclosure of secrets (MCDS) protocol in the plain model from bilinear maps, which is constructed from techniques introduced in [Benhamouda and Lin, TCC 2020].
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2021-09-20: last updated
- 2021-09-20: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/1230
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1230,
author = {Amit Agarwal and James Bartusek and Vipul Goyal and Dakshita Khurana and Giulio Malavolta},
title = {Two-Round Maliciously Secure Computation with Super-Polynomial Simulation},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/1230},
year = {2021},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1230}
}