Paper 2021/1310 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2021/1310 ↗
Related-Tweak Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round TweAES
Abstract
We consider the related-tweak impossible differential cryptanalysis of \texttt{TweAES}. It is one of the underlying primitives of Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) scheme \texttt{ESTATE} which was accepted as one of second-round candidates in the NIST Lightweight Cryptography Standardization project. Firstly, we reveal several properties of \texttt{TweAES}, which show what kinds of distinguishers are more effective in recovering keys. With the help of automatic solver Simple Theorem Prover (STP), we achieve many 5.5-round related-tweak impossible differentials with fixed input differences and output differences that just have one active byte. Then, we implement 8-round key recovery attacks against \texttt{TweAES} based on one of these 5.5-round distinguishes. Moreover, another 5.5-round distinguisher that has four active bytes at the end is utilized to mount a 7-round key recovery attack against \texttt{TweAES}, which needs much lower attack complexities than the 6-round related-tweak impossible differential attack of \texttt{TweAES} in the design document. Our 8-round key recovery attack is the best one against \texttt{TweAES} in terms of the number of rounds and complexities so far.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2021-09-28: last updated
- 2021-09-28: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/1310
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1310,
author = {Chao Niu and Muzhou Li and Meiqin Wang and Qingju Wang and Siu-Ming Yiu},
title = {Related-Tweak Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round TweAES},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/1310},
year = {2021},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1310}
}