Paper 2021/1638 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2021/1638 ↗
00
Abstract
What is the funniest number in cryptography (Episode 2 )? 0 . The reason is that ∀x, x ∗ 0 = 0, i.e., the equation is always satisfied no matter what x is. We’ll use zero to attack zero-knowledge proof (ZKP). In particular, we’ll discuss a critical issue in a cutting-edge ZKP PLONK C++ implementation which allows an attacker to create a forged proof that all verifiers will accept. We’ll show how theory guides the attack’s direction. In practice, the attack works like a charm and we’ll show how the attack falls through a chain of perfectly aligned software cracks. In the same codebase, there is an independent critical ECDSA bug where (r, s) = (0, 0) is a valid signature for arbitrary keys and messages, but we won’t discuss it further because it’s a known ECDSA attack vector in the Google Wycheproof project that I worked on a few years ago. All bugs have been responsibly disclosed through the vendor’s bug bounty program with total reward ~ $15,000 (thank you).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2021-12-17: last updated
- 2021-12-17: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/1638
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1638,
author = {Nguyen Thoi Minh Quan},
title = {00},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/1638},
year = {2021},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1638}
}