Paper 2021/462 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2021/462 ↗

SoK: How (not) to Design and Implement Post-Quantum Cryptography

James Howe
Thomas Prest
Daniel Apon
Abstract

Post-quantum cryptography has known a Cambrian explosion in the last decade. What started as a very theoretical and mathematical area has now evolved into a sprawling research field, complete with side-channel resistant embedded implementations, large scale deployment tests and standardization efforts. This study systematizes the current state of knowledge on post-quantum cryptography. Compared to existing studies, we adopt a transversal point of view and center our study around three areas: (i) paradigms, (ii) implementation, (iii) deployment. Our point of view allows to cast almost all classical and post-quantum schemes into just a few paradigms. We highlight trends, common methodologies, and pitfalls to look for and recurrent challenges.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2021-04-12: last updated
2021-04-12: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/462
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/462,
      author = {James Howe and Thomas Prest and Daniel Apon},
      title = {SoK: How (not) to Design and Implement Post-Quantum Cryptography},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/462},
      year = {2021},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/462}
}
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