Paper 2021/625 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2021/625 ↗
Plactic key agreement (insecure?)
Abstract
Plactic key agreement is a new key agreement scheme that uses Knuth’s multiplication of semistandard tableaus from combinatorial algebra. The security of plactic key agreement relies on the difficulty of some computational problems, such as division of semistandard tableaus. Division by erosion uses backtracking to divide tableaus. Division by erosion is estimated to be infeasible against public keys of 768 or more bytes. If division by erosion is the best attack against plactic key agreement, then secure plactic key agreement could be practical. Chris Monico found a new attack on plactic key agreement, which is fast, potentially polynomial-time, and could very well make plactic key agreement insecure.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2022-09-23: last updated
- 2021-05-17: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/625
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/625,
author = {Daniel R. L. Brown},
title = {Plactic key agreement (insecure?)},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/625},
year = {2021},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/625}
}