Paper 2021/790 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2021/790 ↗
A Side-Channel Assisted Attack on NTRU
Abstract
We take a look at the current implementation of NTRU submitted to the NIST post-quantum standardization project, and identify two strong sources of leakage in the unpacking of the secret key. The strength of the leakages is due to the target processor handling data with very different Hamming weight depending on parts of the secret key. We focus on using only these strong leakages, present a single-trace side-channel attack that reliably recovers a large portion of the secret key, and use lattice reduction techniques to find the remaining parts. Further, we show how small changes to the implementation greatly reduces the leakage without any overhead.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2021-06-14: last updated
- 2021-06-14: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/790
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/790,
author = {Amund Askeland and Sondre Rønjom},
title = {A Side-Channel Assisted Attack on NTRU},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/790},
year = {2021},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/790}
}