Paper 2021/920 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2021/920 ↗
Non-malleable Commitments against Quantum Attacks
Abstract
We construct, under standard hardness assumptions, the first non-malleable commitments secure against quantum attacks. Our commitments are statistically binding and satisfy the standard notion of non-malleability with respect to commitment. We obtain a $\log^\star(\lambda)$-round classical protocol, assuming the existence of post-quantum one-way functions. Previously, non-malleable commitments with quantum security were only known against a restricted class of adversaries known as synchronizing adversaries. At the heart of our results is a new general technique that allows to modularly obtain non-malleable commitments from any extractable commitment protocol, obliviously of the underlying extraction strategy (black-box or non-black-box) or round complexity. The transformation may also be of interest in the classical setting.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2022-06-18: last updated
- 2021-07-09: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/920
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/920,
author = {Nir Bitansky and Huijia Lin and Omri Shmueli},
title = {Non-malleable Commitments against Quantum Attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/920},
year = {2021},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/920}
}