Paper 2022/054 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/054 ↗
SIKE Channels
Abstract
We present new side-channel attacks on SIKE, the isogeny-based candidate in the NIST PQC competition. Previous works had shown that SIKE is vulnerable to differential power analysis and pointed to coordinate randomization as an effective countermeasure. We show that coordinate randomization alone is not sufficient, as SIKE is vulnerable to a class of attacks similar to refined power analysis in elliptic curve cryptography, named zero-value attacks. We describe and confirm in the lab two such attacks leading to full key recovery, and analyze their countermeasures.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2022-01-18: last updated
- 2022-01-18: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/054
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/054,
author = {Luca De Feo and Nadia El Mrabet and Aymeric Genêt and Novak Kaluđerović and Natacha Linard de Guertechin and Simon Pontié and Élise Tasso},
title = {SIKE Channels},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/054},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/054}
}