Paper 2022/1012 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1012 ↗
Nonce-Misuse Resilience of Romulus-N and GIFT-COFB
Abstract
We analyze nonce-misuse resilience (NMRL) security of Romulus-N and GIFT-COFB, the two finalists of NIST Lightweight Cryptography project for standardizing lightweight authenticated encryption. NMRL, introduced by Ashur et al. at CRYPTO 2017, is a relaxed security notion from a stronger, nonce-misuse resistance notion. We proved that Romulus-N and GIFT-COFB have nonce-misuse resilience. For Romulus-N, we showed the perfect privacy (NMRL-PRIV) and n/2-bit authenticity (NMRL-AUTH) with graceful degradation with respect to nonce repetition. For GIFT-COFB, we showed n/4-bit security for both NMRL-PRIV and NMRL-AUTH notions.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2023-02-15: last updated
- 2022-08-05: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1012
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1012,
author = {Akiko Inoue and Chun Guo and Kazuhiko Minematsu},
title = {Nonce-Misuse Resilience of Romulus-N and GIFT-COFB},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1012},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1012}
}