Paper 2022/1039 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1039 ↗

Theoretical Limits of Provable Security Against Model Extraction by Efficient Observational Defenses

Ari Karchmer
Abstract

Can we hope to provide provable security against model extraction attacks? As a step towards a theoretical study of this question, we unify and abstract a wide range of "observational" model extraction defenses (OMEDs) --- roughly, those that attempt to detect model extraction by analyzing the distribution over the adversary's queries. To accompany the abstract OMED, we define the notion of complete OMEDs --- when benign clients can freely interact with the model --- and sound OMEDs --- when adversarial clients are caught and prevented from reverse engineering the model. Our formalism facilitates a simple argument for obtaining provable security against model extraction by complete and sound OMEDs, using (average-case) hardness assumptions for PAC-learning, in a way that abstracts current techniques in the prior literature. The main result of this work establishes a partial computational incompleteness theorem for the OMED: any efficient OMED for a machine learning model computable by a polynomial size decision tree that satisfies a basic form of completeness cannot satisfy soundness, unless the subexponential Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption does not hold. To prove the incompleteness theorem, we introduce a class of model extraction attacks called natural Covert Learning attacks based on a connection to the Covert Learning model of Canetti and Karchmer (TCC '21), and show that such attacks circumvent any defense within our abstract mechanism in a black-box, nonadaptive way. As a further technical contribution, we extend the Covert Learning algorithm of Canetti and Karchmer to work over any "concise" product distribution (albeit for juntas of a logarithmic number of variables rather than polynomial size decision trees), by showing that the technique of learning with a distributional inverter of Binnendyk et al. (ALT '22) remains viable in the Covert Learning setting.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2026-03-05: last updated
2022-08-11: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1039
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1039,
      author = {Ari Karchmer},
      title = {Theoretical Limits of Provable Security Against Model Extraction by Efficient Observational Defenses},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1039},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1039}
}
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