Paper 2022/1044 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1044 ↗

Oblivious Revocable Functions and Encrypted Indexing

Abstract

Many online applications, such as online file backup services, support the sharing of indexed data between a set of devices. These systems may offer client-side encryption of the data, so that the stored data is inaccessible to the online host. A potentially desirable goal in this setting would be to protect not just the contents of the backed-up files, but also their identifiers. However, as these identifiers are typically used for indexing, a deterministic consistent mapping across devices is necessary. Additionally, in a multi-device setting, it may be desirable to maintain an ability to revoke a device’s access—e.g. through rotating encryption keys for new data. We present a new primitive, called the Oblivious Revocable Function (ORF), which operates in the above setting and allows identifiers to be obliviously mapped to a consistent value across multiple devices, while enabling the server to permanently remove an individual device’s ability to map values. This permits a stronger threat model against metadata, in which metadata cannot be derived from identifiers by a revoked device colluding with the service provider, so long as the service provider was honest at the instant of revocation. We describe a simple Diffie- Hellman-based construction that achieves ORFs and provide a proof of security under the UC framework.