Paper 2022/1097 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1097 ↗

Post-Quantum Security of Tweakable Even-Mansour, and Applications

Gorjan Alagic
Chen Bai
Jonathan Katz
Christian Majenz
Patrick Struck
Abstract

The tweakable Even-Mansour construction yields a tweakable block cipher from a public random permutation. We prove post-quantum security of tweakable Even-Mansour when attackers have quantum access to the random permutation but only classical access to the secretly-keyed construction, the relevant setting for most real-world applications. We then use our results to prove post-quantum security—in the same model—of the symmetric-key schemes Chaskey (an ISO-standardized MAC), Elephant (an AEAD finalist of NIST's lightweight cryptography standardization effort), and a variant of Minalpher (an AEAD second-round candidate of the CAESAR competition).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2024-02-29: last updated
2022-08-24: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1097
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1097,
      author = {Gorjan Alagic and Chen Bai and Jonathan Katz and Christian Majenz and Patrick Struck},
      title = {Post-Quantum Security of Tweakable Even-Mansour, and Applications},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1097},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1097}
}
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