Paper 2022/1114 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1114 ↗

Multi-User Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption with Corrupted Participants

Javad Ghareh Chamani
Yun Wang
Dimitrios Papadopoulos
Mingyang Zhang
Rasool Jalili
Abstract

We study the problem of multi-user dynamic searchable symmetric encryption (DMUSSE) where a data owner stores its encrypted documents on an untrusted remote server and wishes to selectively allow multiple users to access them by issuing keyword search queries. Specifically, we consider the case where some of the users may be corrupted and colluding with the server to extract additional information about the dataset (beyond what they have access to). We provide the first formal security definition for the dynamic setting as well as forward and backward privacy definitions. We then propose μSE, the first provably secure DMUSSE scheme and instantiate it in two versions, one based on oblivious data structures and one based on update queues, with different performance trade-offs. Furthermore, we extend μSE to support verifiability of results. To achieve this, users need a secure digest initially computed by the data owner and changed after every update. We efficiently accommodate this, without relying on a trusted third party, by adopting a blockchain-based approach for the digests’ dissemination and deploy our schemes over the permissioned Hyperledger Fabric blockchain. We prototype both versions and experimentally evaluate their practical performance, both as stand-alone systems and running on top of Hyperledger Fabric.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2022-08-28: last updated
2022-08-28: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1114
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1114,
      author = {Javad Ghareh Chamani and Yun Wang and Dimitrios Papadopoulos and Mingyang Zhang and Rasool Jalili},
      title = {Multi-User Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption with Corrupted Participants},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1114},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1114}
}
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