Paper 2022/1121 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1121 ↗

Practical Attacks on Full-round FRIET

Senpeng wang
Dengguo Feng
Bin Hu
Jie Guan
Tairong Shi
Abstract

FRIET is a duplex-based authenticated encryption scheme proposed at EUROCRYPT 2020. It follows a novel design approach for built-in countermeasures against fault attacks. By a judicious choice of components, the designers propose the permutation FRIET-PC that can be used to build an authenticated encryption cipher denoted as FRIET-AE. And FRIET-AE provides a 128-bit security claim for integrity and confidentiality. In this paper, we research the propagation of pairs of differences and liner masks through the round function of FRIET-PC. For the full-round FRIET-PC, we can construct a differential distinguisher whose probability is 1 and a linear distinguisher whose absolute value of correlation is 1. Moreover, we use the differential distinguisher with probability 1 to construct a set consisting of valid tags and ciphertexts which are not created by legal users. This breaks FRIET-AE's security claim for integrity and confidentiality. As far as we know, this is the first practical attack that threatens the security of FRIET-AE.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2022-12-13: last updated
2022-08-29: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1121
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1121,
      author = {Senpeng wang and Dengguo Feng and Bin Hu and Jie Guan and Tairong Shi},
      title = {Practical Attacks on Full-round FRIET},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1121},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1121}
}
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