Paper 2022/1127 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1127 ↗

GUC-Secure Commitments via Random Oracles: New Impossibility and Feasibility

Zhelei Zhou
Bingsheng Zhang
Hong-Sheng Zhou
Kui Ren
Abstract

In the UC framework, protocols must be subroutine respecting; therefore, shared trusted setup might cause security issues. To address this drawback, Generalized UC (GUC) framework is introduced by Canetti \emph{et al.} (TCC 2007). In this work, we investigate the impossibility and feasibility of GUC-secure commitments using global random oracles (GRO) as the trusted setup. In particular, we show that it is impossible to have a 2-round (1-round committing and 1-round opening) GUC-secure commitment in the global observable RO model by Canetti \emph{et al.} (CCS 2014). We then give a new round-optimal GUC-secure commitment that uses only Minicrypt assumptions (i.e. the existence of one-way functions) in the global observable RO model. Furthermore, we also examine the complete picture on round complexity of the GUC-secure commitments in various global RO models.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2022-09-30: last updated
2022-08-30: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1127
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1127,
      author = {Zhelei Zhou and Bingsheng Zhang and Hong-Sheng Zhou and Kui Ren},
      title = {GUC-Secure Commitments via Random Oracles: New Impossibility and Feasibility},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1127},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1127}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.