Paper 2022/1158 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1158 ↗

Differential Cryptanalysis of K-Cipher

Mohammad Mahzoun
Liliya Kraleva
Raluca Posteuca
Tomer Ashur
Abstract

K-Cipher is an ultra-low latency block cipher with variable-length parameters designed by Intel Labs. In this work, we analyze the security of K-Cipher and propose a differential cryptanalysis attack with the complexity of $2^{29.7}$ for a variant of K-Cipher with state size $n=24$ bits state and block size $m=8$ bits. Our attack recovers the secret key and secret randomizer values with a total length of 240 bits in $\sim 30$ minutes on a standard desktop machine. We show that it is possible to extend the same attack for an arbitrary set of parameters.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2022-09-06: last updated
2022-09-06: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1158
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1158,
      author = {Mohammad Mahzoun and Liliya Kraleva and Raluca Posteuca and Tomer Ashur},
      title = {Differential Cryptanalysis of K-Cipher},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1158},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1158}
}
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