Paper 2022/1212 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1212 ↗
VoteXX: A Solution to Improper Influence in Voter-Verifiable Elections
Abstract
We solve a long-standing challenge to the integrity of votes cast without the supervision of a voting booth: “improper influence,” which we define as any combination of vote buying and voter coercion. Our approach allows each voter, or their trusted agent(s), to cancel their vote in a way that is unstoppable, irrevocable, and forever unattributable to the voter. In particular, our approach enhances security of online, remote, public-sector elections, for which there is a growing need and the threat of improper influence is most acute. In this extended abstract, we introduce the new approach, compare it with previous methods, and concisely summarize the protocols. In our full paper, we give detailed cryptographic protocols, show how they can be applied to several voting settings, describe our implementation in a full voting system called VoteXX, and provide UC proofs. Our system protects against the strongest adversary considered in prior related work and is suitable for widespread use in public elections.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2022-09-14: last updated
- 2022-09-13: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1212
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1212,
author = {David Chaum and Richard T. Carback and Jeremy Clark and Chao Liu and Mahdi Nejadgholi and Bart Preneel and Alan T. Sherman and Mario Yaksetig and Zeyuan Yin and Filip Zagórski and Bingsheng Zhang},
title = {VoteXX: A Solution to Improper Influence in Voter-Verifiable Elections},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1212},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1212}
}