Paper 2022/1258 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1258 ↗
Tightly Secure Chameleon Hash Functions in the Multi-User Setting and Their Applications
Abstract
We define the security notion of (strong) collision resistance for chameleon hash functions in the multi-user setting ((S-)MU-CR security). We also present three constructions, CHF_dl, CHF_rsa and CHF_fac, and prove their tight S-MU-CR security based on the discrete logarithm, RSA and factoring assumptions, respectively. In applications, our tightly S-MU-CR secure chameleon hash functions help us to lift a signature scheme from (weak) unforgeability to strong unforgeability in the multi-user setting, and the security reduction is tightness preserving. Furthermore, they can also be used to construct tightly secure online/offline signatures, chameleon signatures and proxy signatures, etc., in the multi-user setting.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2022-09-22: last updated
- 2022-09-22: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1258
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1258,
author = {Xiangyu Liu and Shengli Liu and Dawu Gu},
title = {Tightly Secure Chameleon Hash Functions in the Multi-User Setting and Their Applications},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1258},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1258}
}