Paper 2022/1261 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1261 ↗

Breaking RSA Generically is Equivalent to Factoring, with Preprocessing

Dana Dachman-Soled
Julian Loss
Adam O'Neill
Abstract

We investigate the relationship between the classical RSA and factoring problems when preprocessing is considered. In such a model, adversaries can use an unbounded amount of precomputation to produce an “advice” string to then use during the online phase, when a problem instance becomes known. Previous work (e.g., [Bernstein, Lange ASI- ACRYPT ’13]) has shown that preprocessing attacks significantly im- prove the runtime of the best-known factoring algorithms. Due to these improvements, we ask whether the relationship between factoring and RSA fundamentally changes when preprocessing is allowed. Specifically, we investigate whether there is a superpolynomial gap between the run- time of the best attack on RSA with preprocessing and on factoring with preprocessing. Our main result rules this out with respect to algorithms in a careful adaptation of the generic ring model [Aggarwal and Maurer, Eurocrypt 2009] to the preprocessing setting. In particular, in this setting we show the existence of a factoring algorithm with polynomially related parameters, for any setting of RSA parameters.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2023-03-05: last updated
2022-09-23: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1261
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1261,
      author = {Dana Dachman-Soled and Julian Loss and Adam O'Neill},
      title = {Breaking RSA Generically is Equivalent to Factoring, with Preprocessing},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1261},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1261}
}
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